Abstract This paper examines the intergenerational effects of the Great Reduction of 1680 in Sweden when the Crown reclaimed half of the estates previously granted to the nobility. The Reduction was one of the most dramatic wealth redistributions in early modern Europe and the most dramatic in the history of Sweden. Despite its widely recognized importance among historians, its long-run economic effects remain largely unquantified. We create a novel dataset of the Swedish nobility featuring precise genealogical links and their land holdings across the Swedish Empire, encompassing Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic region. Using quasi-exogenous variation in who was targeted by the Reduction, we causally estimate the immediate and long-run effects of this negative wealth shock on the wealth, socioeconomic status, and human capital of noble families and their descendants. Intergenerational effects appear limited: the Reduction primarily affected a preexisting elite whose children would have experienced a strong regression toward the mean in wealth and occupational status. At the same time, a new crown-aligned elite formed around the Royal Council. Both groups belonged to the high nobility, yet comparing descendants of confiscated lineages to descendants of Royal Council members reveals striking persistence: more than 150 years later, Council descendants remain wealthier and hold more prestigious occupations.
Abstract We revisit Borjas’ (1992) question of whether slow intergenerational convergence among immigrant groups reflects family transmission or “ethnic capital.” We extend Borjas’ model by applying recently developed latent variable methods that capture dynastic human capital—the influence of parents, as well as grandparents, aunts, and uncles across generations (Adermon et al., 2021). Using Swedish population registers linking three generations, we can map extended family networks for each third-generation immigrant. We also examine whether initial neighborhood placement and heterogeneity across immigrant groups contribute to persistence. Our results show that dynastic human capital accounts for most of the long-run transmission of educational outcomes, while ethnic capital plays only a limited role.
Abstract We study how personal exposure to suspected vaccine adverse events affects future vaccine uptake in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2021, several European countries suspended the AstraZeneca vaccine after indications of vaccine-induced thrombosis. Although clinically confirmed cases were extremely rare, extensive media coverage may have created a perception of a broader link between COVID-19 vaccines and blood clots. Governments face a difficult trade-off: acting quickly is vital to prevent harm, yet premature interventions risk amplifying fears and discouraging vaccination. This paper speaks to the scope of these costs by studying how salient personal experiences lead individuals to overestimate the likelihood of adverse events and infer, often incorrectly, that they developed a vaccine-related symptom. Using new Swedish register data on reported adverse events, vaccination uptake, and healthcare use, together with matching methods, we estimate the effects of exposure to blood clots unlikely to have been caused by COVID-19 vaccination. We find, first, that such exposure increases hesitancy toward subsequent doses, plausibly due to false attribution. Second, effects are strongest for blood-clot-related conditions—the ones most similar to vaccine-induced thrombosis—where uptake falls by 4 percentage points, suggesting an important role for health authorities and media in shaping perceptions. When clinicians report the events as suspected side effects, subsequent uptake drops by a further 13 percentage points, indicating that cues from healthcare providers also shape perceived risk and influence future vaccine decisions.